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court's addition to the statute by interpretation reaches a desirable end,
in that it prevents one party from abandoning the other without cause
and then taking advantage of his own wrong to secure a divorce.
The court further declared that to obtain a divorce under the 1931
act there must be a separation by mutual agreement, express or im-
plied 20 The question then arises, where a party has been wrongfully
abandoned without any agreement, is that party to be denied a divorce?
The answer is that -under the older statute, passed in 1907, and already
discussed herein together with its subsequent modifications, the divorce
may be secured. 21
It is hard to see any necessity for two separation statutes, with di-
verse and confusing interpretations. The next legislature should pass a
single separation statute and expressly repeal the others.
JAMES A. WELLONS, JR.
Insurance-Subrogation-Right of Insured Debtor and
Creditor to Insurance Money.
X Company made a loan of $3,000 to A and took a mortgage on A's
house as security. A conveyed the house to B, who assumed the mort-
gage, and as additional security the X Company took out an insurance
policy on the life of B, paying the premiums therefor. Fifteen months
later B conveyed to C, and C in turn to D, each assuming the mort-
gage. Title to the house remained in D until the death of B two and
one-half year later. The X Company collected the insurance, kept
an amount equal to the sum due on the mortgage, and sent the mort-
gate to D who cancelled it of record. The administratrix of B brought
action for the surplus insurance and also asked to be subrogated to the
position of X Company as to the mortgage, contending that the estate
itself had satisfied the indebtedness. By agreement of the defendants,
X c mpany and D, the administratrix was allowed that portion of
the insurance in excess of the debt. The court refused to allow subroga-
tion, and thus allowed D to hold the property free from the mortgage
indebtedness.'
'The words of the court are: "Where a husband and wife have lived separate
and apart from each other for two years, following a separation by mutual agree-
ment, express or implied, their marriage may be dissolved; but where they have
lived separate and apart from each other for two years, without a previous agree-
ment between them, neither is entitled to a divorce, under the statute, C. S.
§1659 (a)." Parker v. Parker, 210 N. C. 264, 266, 186 S. E. 346, 347 (1936). Hyder
v. Hyder, 210 N. C. 486 (1936) followed Parker v. Parker.
"John A. Livingstone, Grounds for Divorce, The Raleigh News and Observer,
September 13, 1936, at p. 3 discusses the case of Parker v. Parker. H. W. Mc-
GALLII&RD, "WOMAN AND THE LAW" c. on Divorce, which shall soon be published
by the N. C. Institute of Government.
'Miller v. Potter, 210 N. C. 268, 186 S. E. 350 (1936).
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The practice of the creditor insuring his debtor is not a thing
new or uncommon to the business world. In the usual situation the
debtor takes out insurance, naming his estate as beneficiary, and then
makes an assignment of the policy as collateral security to the creditor
"as his interest might appear," the creditor thereafter paying the pre-
miums. Inasmuch as a contract provision is involved the courts are
uniform in allowing the estate of the insured the excess insurance.2
Although the contract provision that the creditor take only to the ex-
tent of his interest be omitted, still the courts hold that the debtor
is entitled to the surplus.3 In the circumstance where the creditor takes
out the policy and pays the premiums, the majority of the courts seem
to say that the creditor will be allowed to retain only the insurance to
the extent of his debt, the debtor's estate getting the remainder.4 The
courts reason that the policy, above the amount of the creditor's claim, is
for the debtor's benefit and to hold otherwise the court would be sup-
porting a wagering contract. However, it will be observed that in most of
the cases that laid down the above rule, the evidence showed either an as-
signment by the debtor by way of collateral security or that the cred-
itor had procured the insurance under an agreement with the debtor.
In the absence of these factors there is good authority holding that the
creditor may retain all, reasoning that the contract is one with which
the debtor has no concern,5 this seeming to be better from the logical
standpoint. No case where the creditor took out the policy and the
debtor paid the premiums has been found, but one textwriter, at
least, intimates that the debtor would be entitled to the surplus., Such
' Benes v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 282 Ill. 236, 118 N. E. 443 (1917) (assignee
had no interest, so he was not allowed to recover anything under the policy) ; Bush
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 214 S. W. 175 (Mo. 1919) ; Freeman v. Anding, 69
S. W. (2d) 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).8Deal v. Hainley, 135 Mo. App. 507, 116 S. W. 1 (1909) ; VANcE, IN sURANcE(2d ed. 1930) §163; see Haberfield v. Mayer, 256 Pa. 151, 100 Atl. 587 (1917).
Contra: Fitzgerald v. Rawlings Implement Co., 114 Md. 470, 79 Ati. 915 (1911).
'Tateum v. Ross, 150 Mass. 440, 23 N. E. 230 (1890) ; VAxcE, loc. cit. supra
note 3; see Warnocke v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1881) (assignment as
collateral) ; Exchange Bank of Macon v. Loh, 104 Ga. 446, 31 S. E. 459 (1898)(assignment involved) ; Lanouette v. Laplante, 67 N. H. 118, 36 Atl. 981 (1892)(beneficiary took out policy with no interest in life of insured, but under agree-
ment with insured, and the court allowed the estate of insured to recover entire
policy, less premiums paid by the beneficiary); Roller v. Moore's Adm'r, 86
Va. 512, 10 S. E. 241 (1889) (held: assignee of insurance policy had no insurable
interest above the debt).
5 Grant's Adm'rs v. Kline; 115 Pa. 618, 9 Atl. 150 (1887) (insurance did not
occupy the position of collateral security) ; Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223, 22
Atl. 865 (1891); VANcE, loc. cit. supra note 3; see Amick v. Butler, 111 Ind.
578, 12 N. E. 518 (1887) (assignment with agreement to reassign upon payment
of debt, this condition not being met) ; Fitzgerald v. Rawlings Implement Co.,
114 Ind. 470, 79 Atl. 915 (1911) (assignment, but provided that such was not
to secure any indebtedness).
'.MAY, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1891) §459(a).
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a view seems to be in line with sound reasoning. The abandonment by
the defendants in the principal case of their claim to the money not
necessary to the satisfaction of the mortgage, puts them in the posi-
tion of accepting the majority view.
The principal problem before the court involved subrogation. This
doctrine is generally said to presuppose an existing indebtedness, and
can only be invoked by one under liability.' Such a requirement was met
in the instant case by an assumption of the mortgage by B's grantee,
a principal-surety relationship arising.8 In addition to the above, the
party seeking to invoke subrogation must have paid the debt.0 This
prerequisite was not met since the facts of the case as stated in the
court's decision indicate that B contributed nothing towards the in-
surance premiums. No right to subrogation could be invoked other
than on this score.
However, under the facts as found by the referee, and to which
no exceptions were filed, there appears to be an important omission in
the opinion of the Supreme Court; namely, that although X company
took out the policy, and paid the premiums, it was done with the in-
sured's money, he having become liable for the premiums when he as-
sumed the mortgage given by A to X Company.' 0
But, with the addition of these facts, can it be said that the money
of plaintiff's intestate satisfied the mortgage indebtedness? In the
recent case of Russel v. Owen" the beneficiary was surety for the
insured upon an obligation secured by an assignment of the policy and
a deed of trust. However, this policy, in fact, was not taken out on be-
half of the beneficiary, but to secure the insurance company, it being
the creditor. On the death of the insured the proceeds of the insur-
ance were used in satisfying the obligation. The beneficiary brought
an action to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor in the deed of
trust and the court allowed her claim. The court reasoned that the
beneficiary's interest became vested on the death of the insured and
thus the beneficiary's money paid the obligation for which she was
surety. The result reached is apparently in line with the conclusion
reached by two other states.12 But the decision has been criticized vigor-
71 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed 1905) §363.
8 1 BRANDT, op. cit. supra note 7, §333; see (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rsv'. 337 for
a discussion of the problem of whether the mortgagor becomes a surety to the
mortagee, when the mortgage is assumed by the grantee.
9 1 BRANDy, op. cit. supra note 7, §332.
1 Record on Appeal 35, Miller v. Potter, 210 N. C. 268, 186 S. E. 350 (1936).
"203 N. C. 262, 165 S. E. 687 (1932).
Barbin v. Moore, 85 N. H. 362, 159 Atl. 409 (1932) (the insurance com-
pany was not the creditor) ; Katz v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 127 Ohio St. 531, 191 N. E.
782 (1934) (promisory notes involved, with no mortgage security); see Smith
v. Wells, 72 Ind. App. 29, 122 N. E. 334 (1919) (subrogation allowed due to
prior agreement).
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ously.'3 due to its defeat of the evident intention of the insured, and at
least one state has refused to override this intention.14 In order to get a
result in the principal case similar to the result reached above one as-
sumption must be made; namely, that where a creditor takes out insur-
ance on the debtor's life as security for his obligation, with the debtor
paying the premiums, having in fact been under a liability to so do,
the debtor's estate should be in substantially the same position as the
beneficiary where a debtor takes out a policy of insurance, naming a
beneficiary, and later assigns such policy to the creditor as collateral se-
curity for his obligation.
From the practical aspect of the principal case there seems to be no
great dissimilarity between the two arrangements. The court had before
it a very "close case," but subrogation "was invented to do substantial
justice between the parties."' 5 Therefore, since the deceased in effect
has paid the premiums, and the creditor has been satisfied, the deceased's
estate should receive the product of the insurance, namely, the satisfied
mortgage.
J. WILLIAM COPELAND.
Parent and Child-Child's Right to Sue Parent for Support.
An infant of six years, by a next friend, instituted an action against
her father for support and maintenance.' The parents of this minor
child bad been divorced and the custody awarded to the mother. The
court held for the plaintiff.
The usual means of enforcing the obligation of a parent to support
the child is an action by a third party against the parent for the value
of necessaries furnished the child, or a decree for support of the child
in a divorce suit, or criminal proceedings.2 In allowing the child to sue
its parent directly, the usual form of action being otherwise, the North
Carolina court has shown itself most liberal in the treatment of the par-
ent and child relationship.
At common law id England the duty of a parent to sup-
port his child was considered merely moral, and neither a suit
by the child for support nor an action by a third party for necessaries
was allowed.3 In a great many of our jurisdictions the duty has been
(1933) 11 N. C. L. Rv. 169.
' Kash Ex'r v. Kash, 260 Ky. 508, 86 S. W. (2d) 273 (1935); Berger v.
Berger, 264 Ky. 225, 94 S. W. (2d) 618 (1936).(1936) 14 N. C. L. REv. 295, 296.
'Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936).
'Note (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1277.
'Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 481 (1840) ; Shelton v. Springett, 11 C. B.
452 (1851) ; Bazeley v. Forder, L. R. 3 Q. B. 559 (1868).
